We develop a theory of representation of interdependent preferences that re¯ect the widely acknowledged phenomenon of keeping up with the Joneses (i.e. of those preferences which maintain that well-being depend oǹ`r elative standing'' in the society as well as on material consumption). The principal ingredient of our analysis is the assumption that individuals desire to occupy a (subjectively) better position than their peers. This is quite a primitive starting point in that it does not give any reference to what is actually regarded as``status'' in the society. We call this basic postulate negative interdependence, and study its implications. In particular, combining this assumption with some other basic postulates that are widely used in a number of other branches of the theory of individual choice, we axiomatize the relative income hypothesis, and obtain an operational representation of interdependent preferences.
Introduction
The idea that the welfare of an individual depends on the relative as well as the absolute income (or consumption) goes at least as far back as to Thorstein Veblen:
We would like to thank Jordi Gali, Itzhak Gilboa, Andy Postlewaite, Ariel Rubinstein, Tony Shorrocks, Peter Wakker, and Lin Zhou along with two anonymous referees, while, of course, the usual disclaimer applies. The support of the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics is also gratefully acknowledged. ``. . . the desire for wealth can scarcely be satiated in any individual instance . . . the ground of [this need] is the desire of everyone to excel everyone else in the accumulation of goods. '' Veblen (1899, p. 32)1 This basic insight has later been reformulated in several distinct ways to capture the notion that one's well-being is determined not only by the intrinsic utility of her material consumption, but also by one's relative standing (status) in the society or in her peer group (Duesenberry 1949 , Easterlin 1974 , Layard 1980 , Frank 1985 .2 In the economics literature, this notion is sometimes referred to as the relative income hypothesis, or as the phenomenon of keeping up with the Joneses, and is usually introduced to the models by postulating envious preferences on the part of the individuals. Furthermore, it is noted by several authors that, in some cases, the individuals may care about their relative standing in the society simply because a higher status implies better access to goods which the individuals value (Cole et al. 1992) .
It is also evident that building the``relative position'' concerns of individuals into economic models may well have far-reaching implications. There is in fact a sizable literature that demonstrates that this is precisely the case.3 Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the fundamental problem of`r epresenting the preferences of the individuals who care about their relative standing'' is not addressed in the literature. Most authors have simply postulated some particular ways of formalizing the notion of``relative standing'' (such as one's relative income, or income rank in the society), and have accordingly modi®ed the utility functions of the constituent agents in a more or less ad hoc manner. Clearly, such an approach carries a considerable level of arbitrariness in the way it alters the individual preference relations, and 1 Also cited in Becker (1974) .
2 The signi®cance of one's``relative position'' has been prevalent in the sociopsychological approaches to subjective well-being; see Diener (1984) for a survey of the related psychological literature. There is also a large body of direct and indirect empirical evidence in support of this fundamental hypothesis. See, for instance, Easterlin (1974), Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1982) , van de Stadt, et al. (1985) , Tomes (1986), and Clark and Oswald (1996) . Frank (1985, p. 5) notes that``. . . abundant evidence suggests that people do in fact care much more about how their incomes compare with those of their peers than about how large their incomes are in any absolute sense. Most poor citizens of the United States enjoy an absolute consumption standard that would be the envy of all but the richest citizens of, say, India. Yet the poor here are often said to be much less content with their lot than are the upper-middle class citizens of many poorer nations.'' 3 In the context of income taxation and public policy, for instance, the implications of the relative income hypothesis are analyzed by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978 ), Layard (1980 ), Oswald (1983 ), Ng (1987 ), Villar (1988 ), Blomquist (1993 ), and Mitra et al. (1997 . Related applications to the theory of asset pricing include Abel (1990) and Galõ Â (1994) . Moreover, while Frank (1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) study the theory of wage determination with interdependent preferences, Robson (1992) reexamines the Friedman-Savage theory of attitudes towards risk when individuals care about their wealth also via the relative standing that wealth entails.
